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FACTS
Section 8014(3) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of
2000 (Act) required the Department of Defense (DOD) to perform a "most
efficient and cost-effective organization analysis" before using appropriated
funds to pay private contractors for work previously performed by more than
ten government employees.' The DOD could avoid this analysis if it chose
to outsource a "commercial or industrial type function" to a "qualified firm
under 51 percent Native American Ownership. 2 The Air Force awarded a
contract at the Kirtland Air Force Base (Kirtland) in New Mexico to
Chugach Management Services Joint Venture (Chugach), a qualified firm.3
It was the only contract that the DOD awarded under section 8014(3). 4
Two civilian DOD employees and the American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO (Plaintiffs), an affiliated local union that
represents civilian DOD employees at Kirtland, alleged that the civilian
employees were displaced when the Air Force awarded the contract to
Chugach.5 They claimed that section 8014(3) violated the equal protection
element of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and substantive due
process by depriving them of an interest in federal employment.6
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
allowed Chugach to intervene as a defendant alongside the United States and
denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.7  Both sides
subsequently moved for summary judgment.8 Finding no fundamental right
to federal employment, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on the substantive due process claim.9 The court construed
section 8014(3) to apply only to ownership by an Indian tribe.'0 Applying
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub.L.No. 106-79, § 8014, 113 Stat. 1212, 1234
(1999).
2 Id. § 8014(3), 113 Stat. at 1234.
3 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F.3d 513,516 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
4 Id. at 517.
5 Id. at 516.
6 Id. at 517.
7 Jd. (citing Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C.
2000)).
Id.
9 Id. (citing Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 2d 4, 25 (D.D.C.
2002)).
0 Id. (citing Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 2d 4, 18-24 (D.D.C.
2002)).
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the rational basis standard, the court found no unconstitutional
discrimination." Plaintiffs appealed the decision.'
2
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the due process and equal
protection claims, ruling that Congress should be granted great deference
when regulating commerce with Indian Tribes.'
3
ANALYSIS
The court began its analysis by limiting its scope of review for the
case.' 4  Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the government from awarding any
contract based on section 8014(3). 5 Because the Act only applied to the
2000 fiscal year, the court rendered that claim for relief moot.' 6 Plaintiffs
also sought to enjoin the government from renewing any contract awarded
under section 8014(3). 17 To allow that claim to proceed, the court found that
Plaintiffs must be under a real and imminent threat of harm.'8 Plaintiffs
failed to show that any contract was awarded under section 8014(3) other
than the Chugach contract.' 9 As this particular claim related to any contracts
the DOD might award under section 8014(3), not solely those awarded at
Kirtland, the court found that Plaintiffs only had standing to bring claims
related to the Chugach contract because it was the only contract that had the
possibility of inflicting real harm on Plaintiffs.20
Plaintiffs argued that section 8014(3) violated the Constitution
because it allowed preferences for firms owned by Native Americans who
were not tribal members and owned no more than 51% of a firm.2 ' The court
disregarded this claim because it expanded the case beyond its factual
context, as Native Americans own more than 51% of Chugach.2 The court
then reiterated its ruling that Plaintiffs are only entitled to relief relating
11 Id.
12 Id. at 516.
13 Id. at 523.
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specifically to the Kirtland and denied Plaintiffs' invitation to expand the
23scope of the case.
The court then turned to the government's contentions that section
8014(3) should be construed to resolve any constitutional doubts that
Plaintiffs raised and that section 8014(3) applies only to "members" of
federally recognized "tribal entities" and Indian Tribes.24 The court declined
to narrow the interpretation of section 8014(3) by holding that it applies only
to "members" of federally recognized Indian tribes because the government's
interpretation of the statute did not directly relate to the claims brought by
Plaintiffs in this case.25  To offer an interpretation of this kind would be
tantamount to an advisory opinion because any ruling would be based on a
hypothetical, as opposed to an actual, situation.
26
Next, the court distinguished Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
27
from the instant case, concluding that the Native American classification is
different from other racial classifications because Congress has
Constitutional authority to regulate commerce with Indian Tribes.28
Additionally, the court noted that the Supreme Court has sustained
legislation that provides "particular and special treatment" for Indian tribes in
Morton v. Mancari.29 Congress has broader authority to draft legislation
favorable to Indian tribes than other minority groups.30
23 Id. at 518-19.
24 Id. at 517.
25 Id. at 519.
26 Id.
27 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Under federal law, contractors
received additional compensation if they subcontracted work to firms owned by individuals who were
members of socially and economically disadvantaged groups. Id. at 205. "Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities" were considered to be
socially and economically disadvantaged. Id. A subcontractor sued after a main contractor rejected its
low bid in favor of a firm owned by a minority. Id. The Court did not focus on which minority group
received the contract but the preference for minority groups in general. Id. at 206-07. The Court ruled
that the government's use of race as a classification must be "compelling," and the correct standard to
apply is strict scrutiny. Id. at 237-38.
28 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F.3d 513,520 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
29 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). Plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 repealed preferences in the Bureau of Indian Affairs for hiring Indians. Id. at
539. The Court rejected this claim, finding that Congress did not intend to overrule the preference by
implication. Id. at 547-50. Additionally, the Court found that the plaintiffs' due process claims must be
considered in light of Congress's "guardian-ward" status toward Indian Tribes. Id. at 551. The Court
concluded that the preference did not violate due process because "[a]s long as the special treatment [of
Indians] can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id. at 555.
30 Am. Fed'n of Gov 't Employees, 330 F.3d at 520.
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Plaintiffs sought to reconcile Adarand with other cases allowing
preferences for members of Indian Tribes.3' They characterized the
treatment of Indians under section 8014(3) as preferences for a distinct social
group, which would be tantamount to an illegal preference.32 The court
rejected the argument because legislation benefiting Indian Tribes shall not
be examined under the same terms as suspect racial classifications.33
Plaintiffs claimed that the proper standard to apply was strict
scrutiny, despite precedents that called for the rational basis standard.34 They
argued that the Supreme Court had only found preferences for Indians to be
constitutional in the context of employment in the Indian service. The
court found that the critical factor in its determination is Congress's power to
regulate commerce "'with the Indian Tribes. ' '3 6  Incident to this power,
Congress may regulate tribal members.37 Plaintiffs claimed that no record of
Congressional motivation or proof of Congressional intent for the enactment
of section 8014(3) existed and therefore, the court could not rationally
review Congress's motives.38 The court noted that Congress is not required
to publish its lawmaking findings and the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate its own proceedings.39 The court stated that if Congress
had acted reasonably, the court need not make further inquiries regarding the
constitutionality of the law, regardless of whether Congress explicitly stated
its reasoning.40 As a result, the court found that it had been proper for the
district court to examine legislative material produced in analogous contexts
to determine Congressional intent.4'
Plaintiffs also claimed that section 8014(3) violated substantive due
process under the Fifth Amendment because they had a property interest in
federal employment.42  The court found that in the absence of an
infringement of a fundamental interest or a suspect classification, the Fifth
Amendment only requires a rational basis review.43 Additionally, the court
31 Id. at 521.
32 Id.
33 Id. See generally Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463 (1979); Morton v. Mancai, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
34 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 521 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
35 Id.
36 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 522.
39 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2).
40 Id. at 521.
4 Id. (citing Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 2d 4, 23 (D.D.C.
2002)),
42 Id. at 523.
43 Id.
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noted that the Supreme Court had never recognized an interest in federal
employment as a fundamental right."4 As a result, the court found that
rational basis review was appropriate and that Plaintiffs had failed to prove
their due process claim.
45
CONCLUSION
The court's affirmation of section 8014(3) is one piece of a larger
legislative and judicial effort to afford greater rights and protections to
Indians, Native Alaskans, and Native Hawaiians (Native Americans). While
some reparations have been granted to Native Americans for takings of land
affected by Congress and approved by the judiciary,46 many economic and
non-economic problems caused by such takings have not been remedied 7
The Constitution provides a basis for treating Indian Tribes differently from
other racial and ethnic groups, as well as from society at large.48 This basis
has provided recent benefits to Native Americans, 49 but these remunerations
are merely Congress's recent response to the many social and economic
problems that exist for Native Americans. °
In the past, Congress's special relationship to Indian Tribes caused at
least as much harm to them as its current system of benefits now provides 51;
similarly, judicial opinions have also had the same effect as Congressional
action by denying ownership, and therefore property rights, to Native
Americans. 2 In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission
Act, 53 the first federal law that gave Indian Tribes various rights to sue for
property claims.5 4 More recently, court decisions, 55 much like recent
" Id.
45 Id.
46 See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations & Restitution: Indian Property Claims
in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453, 468-70,475-77 (1994) (discussing reparation schemes).
47 See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 14-15
(2003) (detailing problems cause by federal Indian policies).
48 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cf. 3.
49 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8014(3) 113 Stat.
1212, 1234 (1999).
SO The Alaska Natives Commission found that "many Alaska Native individuals, families, and
communities were experiencing a social, cultural and economic crisis marked by rampant unemployment,
lack of economic opportunity, alcohol abuse, depression and morbidity and mortality rates that have been
described by health professionals as 'staggering.'" H.R. REP. NO. 104-838, at 1.
51 Newton, supra note 48 at 20 (explaining how Congress acquired land from Indian Tribes).
52 See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
53 Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (repealed 1978).
54 Id. § 70(a).
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Congressional action,56 have treated Native American interests more
favorably than in the past.57 Congress, with its unique power to regulate
commerce with Indian Tribes,5" has enacted several measures to improve the
lives of Native Americans. 59 In the current Congress, legislators have
submitted bills to provide tax incentives for Native Americans, 60 to provide
tax deductions for ground rent on qualified residences on Native American-
owned land,6' and to extend and improve assistance provided by Small
Business Development Centers for Native Americans.62
In this context, section 8014(3) is a continuation of Congressional
and judicial intent to right past wrongs. The purpose of section 8014(3) is to
give the DOD incentive to use firms owned by Native Americans,63 thereby
alleviating the problems that many Native American communities are
currently facing by providing jobs. Section 8014(3) functions as a
reparation, similar to cash payouts for land. It is part of a larger historical
arc, using Constitutional principles as a rationale to grant preferences to
Native Americans. Consequently, the court's examination of section 8014(3)
in this case is consistent with other recent, similar judicial interpretations of
the Constitution." Within this framework, future laws that are similar to
section 8014(3) will be upheld.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Meghan P. Smith
55 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (upholding
the Chippewa Indians' usufructuary rights in land ceded to Wisconsin and Minnesota in 1837).
56 See infra notes 61-54.
57 Bradford, supra note 49.
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1926(c) (2003) (supplying grants to Indians for water management in rural
areas); 15 U.S.C. § 4726 (2003) (providing assistance to Indians to develop foreign markets for Indian
crafts).
60 Tribal Enhancement Act of 2003, S. 1542, 108th Cong. (2003).
61 H.R. 1426, 108th Cong. (2003).
62 H.R. 1166, 108th Cong. (2003).
63 See Paul D. Hancq & Karen S. White, A Preference for Native-American Contractors, 2002-
SEP Army Law 39,42 (2002) (stating that hiring a contractor without doing a most efficient and cost-
effective organizational analysis "can be desirable, since it could save time and money, and may be less
disruptive to the mission").
6 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 521 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
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